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1. SUMMATION. 18 U.S. C. 2518 (b)(iv) provides in pertinent ,. 
"Each application for an order authorizing or approving 
the interception of a wire or oral communication shall 
· include the identity of the person, if know'l committing 
the offense and whose communications are'to be 
intercepted;" 





"Each order authorizing or approving the interception 
of any wire or oral communication shall specify the 
identity of the person, if known, whose communications 
are to be intercepted. " 
The questions are twofold. fue first is whether, under the above 
quoted sections of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, a person whose identity as a possible user of a 
telephone is known but whose involvement in illegal use of that tele-
phone is riot known at the time, comes within the class of persons who 
must be identified in a wiretap application and order "if known. " 
The second question is whether, under an order authorizing 
the interception of communications "of [the person being investigated] 
and others as yet unlmown, " conversations to which the person being 
investigated was not a party may properly be intercepted. 
2. FACTS. On March 20, 1970, Judge William J. Campbell 
of the USDC for the ND of Illinois isssued an order pursuant to 18 
U.S. C. 2518 authorizing the interception of conversations of "Irving 
Kahn and others as yet unlmown" over two telephones in the Kahn 
residence in connection with, gambling investigation; Irving Kahn's 
wife Minnie was not mentioned. The order required that a status 
report be filed within five days. The report filed with Judge Campbell 
on March 25, 1970, indicated that the interception had been terminated 
because the objective had been attained. It also gave a summary of 





on March 21, Irving Kahn made a telephone call from Arizona to his 
wife in Chicago and discussed gambling wins and losses. On the same 
day Mrs. · Kahn made two telephone calls from the intercepted telephone 
to a lmown gambling figure and discussed numbers and amounts of 
bets placed and the identification of Lettors. 
After the Kahn'i"s were subsequently indicted, they filed motions 
. -
to suppress the wiretap evidence. Judge Thomas R McMillen heard 
the motions and ordered suppressed any conversations between Minnie 
Kahn and others as being outside the scope of Judge Campbell's order. 
3. OPINION BELOW. A divided Court of Appeals affirmeJ. 
The majority held that, under the District Court's order, there were 
two requirements which all intercepted conversations had to satisfy 
before they could be admitted into evidence: (1) that Irving Kahn be 
a party to the conversations and (2) that his conversations intercepted 
,, ,. 
be with, others as yet unlmown. 
The CA 7 majority then construed the above statutory requirements 
for identification of the person, if lmown, whose communications are 
to be intercepted to exclude from the definition of "others as yet unlmown" 
any "persons whom careful investigation by the government would 
disclose were probably using the Kahn telephones in conversations for 
illegal activities." The_ CA 7 then concluded that: 
"The government has not shown that had it conducted 
its investigation with the care Congress intended to 




protect personal privacy, it would not have discovered 
whether or not Minnie Kahn had i1nplicated herself by 
her conversations. " 
The CA 7 stated that in view of the failure of the government to 
discover Mrs. Kahn's complicity in the gambling activities or to justify 
the failure to attempt to discover it by the time of the application
1 
"the 
subsequent wiretaps amounted to a virtual general warrant in violation 
I, 
of her Fourth Amendment rights. 
Judge Stevens dissented on this point and concluded that the 
wiretap order in this case authorized interception over the two specified 
telephones of "communications· of Irving Kahn ~others as yet unknown," 
not conversations between Kahn and others, and that, considering the -
language of the issuing judge's findings and of the order, it was "clear 
that the intercept authority was not limited to conversations to which 
Irving Kahn was a party." 
4. CONTENTIONS . The SG seeks certs to overturn the ruling 
of the CA 7 majority. The SG claims the majority opinion raises the 
question of who must be identified in a wiretap application and order 
under Titleill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968. In wiretap situations the SG notes ther e are generally three 
cl~sses of persons involved: first, the person or persons against whom 
the investigation is directed ·1nd probable cause is shown. Second, 
other known users of the target telephones, such as family members 





cause to suspect complicity in criminal activities. Third, there are 
those other persons with whom the target of the investigation will be 
conducting the particular communication sought to be intercepted. It 
is the SG' s position that only persons in the first group need be identified 
in the wiretap application and order, and that communications of those 
in the second and third group may be lawfully intercepted regardless of 
whether the identified party participates. 
The SG characterizes the decision below as holding that the fruits 
of a wiretap order issued upon a finding of probable cause must be 
suppressed to the extent that they include incriminating statements of 
a person not named in the application and order if that person's use 
of the subject telephone could have been anticipated and if the govern-
~ent failed to establish at the time it applied for the order that 
( 1) it had fully investigated the possibility that the persnn was engaged 
in illegal activities and (2) had concluded the person was not implicated. 
The SG contends this decision misapprehends the thrust of the identification 
requirements established by Congress in the portions of the statute 
~ quoted~ 
The SG contends that under the Fourth Amendment, a 
search warrant which particularly describes the property to be seized 
is sufficient even if the owner of the property is not named. The SG 
contends there is no indication that Congress intended to change this 






The SG summarizes its position as contending that there is no 
requlrement in the statute that each member of a household or other 
possible user of the telephone must be investigated prior to requesting 
an interception order when -there is no reason to know of their criminal 
involvement. 
Finally the SG contends that the decision below is in conflict 
with that of the CA 2 in United States v. Fiorella, 468 F. 2d 688 . 
In Fiorella the SG contends that the CA 2 specifically rejected the 
argument that a court authorization to intercept wire communcations 
of certain named persons and "others as yet unknown" constituted a 
general warrant. 
Respondent •d arguments are somewhat lh ii 111, confused . 
The gist of their position seems to be, (110~ever, that the government 
must investigate and perhaps find prob~le cause with regard to each 
-/J,,.J ~Oh b ~ J,-
member of a household before conversations of 4:lllll •••• monitored 
on the household phone may be introduced into evidence. 
n:eui,e 
5. DISCUSSION. To J · the government to investigate 
each member of a family who might be using the phone to determine 
the extent of criminal complicity prior to applying for a court-ordered 
interception involves a . significant burden. The question is important 
enough to merit a grant. 
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1ntea.:---------·rcU."' 
United States, Petitioner, 1 On Writ of Certiorari to°B-Afi 
v. 
Irving Kahn and Minnie 
Kahn 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. 
[February -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
On March 20, 1970, an attorney from the United 
States Department of Justice submitted an application 
for an order authorizing a wiretap interception pursuant 
to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Ac£ of 1970, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520, to Judge 
William J. Campbell of the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois. The affidavit ac-
companying the application contained information in-
dicating that the respondent, Irving Kahn, was a 
bookmaker who operated from his residence and used 
two home telephones to conduct his business.1 The 
1 The affiant, a special a.gent of the Federal Bureau of Invest iga-
tion, provided detailed mformation about Kahn's alleged gambling 
activities. This information was denved from the personal observa-
tions of three unnamed sources, whose past reliability in gambling 
investigations was described by the affiant. In addition, the infor-
mation was corroborated by telephone company records showing calls 
on Kahn's telephones to and from a known gambling figure in 
another State. 
The Government 's application and the accompanyjng affidavit 
also claimed that one Jake Jacobs was usmg a telephone at his 
private residrnce to conduct an illegal gambling business. The sub-
~ 
~ 
I l'i-e::>j 7 t 
~/-~ 
lo?~ ~ ,r 
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affidavit also noted that the Government's informants 
had stated that they would refuse to testify against 
Kahn, that telephone company records alone would be 
insufficient to support a bookmaking conviction, and 
that physical surveillance or normal search-and-seizure 
techniques would be unlikely to produce useful evidence. 
The application therefore concluded that "normal in-
vestigative procedures reasonably appear to be unlikely 
to succeed," and asked for authorization to intercept 
wire communications of Irving Kahn and "others as 
yet unknown" over two named telephone lines, in order 
that information concerning the gambling offenses might 
be obtained. 
Judge Campbell en tered an order, pursuant to 18 
U. S. C. § 2518. approving the application. 2 He specifi.:: 
sequent order of the District Court authorizing wire interceptions 
also covered Jacob's phone. Any communications mtercepted over 
the Jacobs telephone, however, play no role in the issues now 
before us. 
2 18 U. S. C. § 2518 provide;;, in pertinent part : 
'' (1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the 
interception of a wire or oral commumcahon shall be made in writing 
upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and 
shall state the applicant's authority to mnke such application. Each 
application shall include the following information . . . 
'' (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances 
relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should 
be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has 
been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) a particulnr descrip-
tion of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the 
place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a par-
ticular descnptwn of the type of communicatwns sought to be 
intercepted. (1v) the identity of the person, 1f known, committing 
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted ; 
'' (3J Upon such npphcntwn the judge may enter an ex parte 
order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving inter-
72-1328-0PINIO- ' 
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cally found that there was probable cause to believe 
that Irving Kahn and "others as yet unknown" were 
using the two telephones to conduct an illegal gambling 
business, and that normal investigative techniques were 
unlik~iy to succeed in providing federal officials with 
sufficient evidence to successfully prosecute such crimes; 
The order authorized special agents of the F. B. I. td 
ception of wire or oral communications within the territorial juris# 
diction of the court in which the judge is sitting, if the judge deter-
ntines on the basis of the facts submit ted by the applicant that-
" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is com-
mitting, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense 
enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter ; 
" (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communi-
cations concerning that offense will be obtained through 1;uch 
intetcept10n, 
"(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have 
failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to 
be too dangerous , 
" ( d) there is probable cause for belief that the faci lities from 
which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to 
be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection 
with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the 
name of, or common!~- used by such person. 
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any 
Wll"e or oral communication shall specify-
" (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose commumcations 
ilre to be intercepted ; 
" (b) the nature and locat1011 of the commumcations facilities as 
to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted; 
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought 
to be intercepted, and a statement of the pa rticular offense to which 
jt relates : 
'(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the com-
munications, and of the person authorizing the application ; and 
' '(e) the period of time during which such interception is author-
ized, including a statement as to whether or not the foterception 
shall automatically termihllte when the described communication has 
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"intercept wire communications of Irving Kahn and 
others as yet unknown" to and from the two named 
telephones concerning gambling activities. 
The authorization order further provided that status 
reports were to be filed with Judge Campbell on the 
fifth and 10th days following the date of the order, 
showing what progress had been made towards achieve-
ment of the order's objective, and describing any need 
for further interceptions.a The first such report, filed 
with Judge Campbell on March 25, 1970, indicated that 
the wiretap had been termjnated because its objectives 
had been attained. The status report gave a summary 
of the information garnered by the interceptions, stat-
ing in part that on March 21, Irving Kahn made two 
· telephone calls from Arizona to his wife at their home 
in Chicago and discussed gambling wins and losses, and 
that on the same date Minnie Kahn, Irving's wife, made 
two telephone calls from the intercepted telephones to 
a person described in the status report as "a known 
gambling figure," with whom she discussed various kinds 
of betting information. 
Both Irving and Minnie Kahn were subsequently in-
dicted for using a facility in interstate commerce to 
promote, manage, and facilitate an illegal gambling busi-
ness, in violation of 19 U. S. C. § 1952.4 The Govern-
3 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (6) prov1de8, m pertment part : 
''Whenever an order authorizing mterception is entered pur8uant tq 
this chapter, the order may require reports to be made to the judge 
who issued the order showing what progress has been made toward 
achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continueq 
interception. Such reports shall be made at such intervals as the 
judge may require. '' 
4 The Travel Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1952, provide;;. 
·' (a) Whoever travels in intnstate or foreign commerce or uses any 
facility in interstate or foreign commerce , including the mail, with 
intent to-
" (l) dist ribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity ; or 
72-1328-0PINION 
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ment prosecutor notified the Kahns that he intended to 
introduce into evidence at trial the conversations in-
tercepted under the court order. The Kahns in turn 
filed motions to suppress the conversations. These mo-
tions were heard by Judge Thomas R. McMillen in the 
Northern -District of Illinois, who, in an unreported 
opinion, granted the motion to suppress. He viewed 
any conversations between Irving and Minnie Kahn as 
within the "marital privilege," and hence inadmissible 
at trial. 5 In addition, all other conversations in which 
Minnie Kahn was a participant were suppressed as being 
outside the scope of Judge Campbell 's order, on the 
ground that Minnie Kahn was not a person "as yet 
" (2) commit any crime of violence to fu rther any unlawfu l activ-
ity ; or 
" (3 ) otherwise promote, manage, establish , ca rry on, or faci litate 
the promotion, management, establishment, or c.nrying on, of any 
unlawful activity , 
"and thereafter performs or attempts to perfo rm any of the acts 
specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more 
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five ye-drs, or both . 
"(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means (1) any busi-
ness enterpri:se involving gambling, hquor on which the Federal 
excise tax has not been paid, narcotics or controlled substances (as 
defined in section 102 (6) of the Controlled Substances Act), or 
p rostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which 
they are committed or of the United States, or (2) e,.1ortion, 
bn bery, or arson in v10lat10n of the law:; of the State in which 
committed or the United States. 
"(c) Investigat10ns of violations under t lus section involving liquor 
shall be conducted under the superv1s10n of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.'' 
The indictment in this case stated that the alleged gambling activi-
t ies attributed to the Kahns were in v10lation of Ill . Rev. Stat.; 
c. 38,§28-1 (a) , (2),and (10) . 
5 18 U S. C. § 2517 (4) provides that : 
" No otherwise privileged wire or oral commumcat10n mtercepted 
in accordance wfrh , or in violat10n of, the provisions of this chapter 
shall lose its privileged character '' 
6 
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unknown" to the federal authorities at the time of the 
original application. 
The Government filed an interlocutory appeal from 
the suppression order.6 A divided panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
that part of ithe District Court's order suppressing all 
conversations of Minnie Kahn, but reversed that part 
of the order based on the marital privilege. 471 F. 2d 
191. The court held that under the wiretap order all 
intercepted conversations had to meet two requirements 
before they could be admitted into evidence : 
" ( 1) that Irving Kahn be a party to the conver-
sations, and (2) that his conversations intercepted 
be with 'others as yet unknown.'" Id., at 195. 
The court then construed the statutory requirements of 
19 U. S. C. §§ 2518 (l)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a) that 
·. the person whose communications are to be intercepted 
is ·to be identified if known, as excluding from the term 
"others as yet unknown" any "persons whom careful 
investigation by the government would disclose were 
probably using the Kahn telephones in conversations 
for illegal activities." Id., at 196. Since the Govern-
ment in this case had not shown that further investi-
gation of Irving Kahn's activities would not have im-
plicated Minnie in the gambling business, the Court 
of Appeals felt that Mrs. Kahn was not a "person as 
yet unknown" within the purview of Judge Campbell's 
~rder. 
We granted the Government's petition for certiorari, 
411 U. S. 980, in order to resolve a seemingly important 
6 18 U. S. C. § 2518 ( 10) (b) gives the Umted States the right to 
take an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to 
suppress intercepted wire communications. In addition, 18 U. S C. 
§ 3731 generally provides for appeals by the Government from 
orders suppressing evidence. 
72-132-8--0PINibff 
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issue involving the construction of this relatively 
federal statute.' 
7 
At the outset, it is worth noting what issues are not 
involveq in this case. First, we are not presented with ll 
ah a1'tlick_ upon the constitutionality of any part of Title 
Ii[ of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1970, /nor with a challenge to the legality of th~ 
practice of wiretapping in general. econ ly, review o 
t is interlocutory order oes not involve any questions 
as to the propriety of the Justice Department's internirl 
~rocedures in authorizing the application for the wiretap. 8 
I Finally, no argument is presented that the federal agents r 
failed to conduct the wiretap here in such a manner lfs 
to minimize the interception of innocent conversationtl 
'F.he q::uestion presented is simply whether the conversa'-
tions that the Government wishes to introduce into 
evidence at the respondents' trial are made inadmissible" 
by the "others as yet unknown" language of Judge 
Campbell's order or by the corresponding statutory re~ 
<fO.irehlents of Title III. 
fo deciding that Minnie Kahn was not a person "as 
yet unknown" within the meaning of the wiretap ord-er, 
the Court of Appeals relied heavily on an expressed 
objective of Congress in the enactment of Title III:· 
the protection of the personal privacy of those enga:ging 
7 The Kahns' cross-petition for certiorari, raising the marital privi~ 
lege argument, was denied. 411 U. S. 986 . 
8 Such issues are currently sub judice in United States v. Giordanv. 
No. 72-1057, and United States v. Chavez , No. 72-1319. We inti~ 
mate no view as to whether the respondents may properly raise such 
claims in any further proceedings in the District Court in this case: 
9 In relevant part, 18 U.S. C. § 2518 (5) requires that : 
''Every order and extens1o_t1 thereof sh~ll contain a provision that"· 
the - authorization to mtercept . . . shall be conducted in such a· 
way· as- to minimize the interception of communications not otfiec-
wise subject to interception under this chapter- . . • . '"' 
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in wire communications.rn In light of this clear congres"" 
sional concern, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the Gov-
ernment- could not lightly claim that a person whose 
cdrivm'§ations were intercepted was "unknown" within 
the in'eaning of Title III. Thus, it was not enough that 
Mrs. Kahn was not known to be taking part in any 
illegal gambling business at the time that the Govern• 
. ment applied for the wiretap order; in addition, the court/ 
held that the Government was required to show that 
such complicity would not have been discovered had a 
thorough investigation of Mrs. Kahn been conducted 
before · the wiretap application. 
In · our view, neither the legislative history nor the 
specific language of Title III compels this conclusion. 
TcJ be sure; Congress was concerned with protecting in-
dividal privacy when it enacted this statute. But it is 
also clear that Congress intended to authorize electronic 
surveillance as a weapon against the operations of orga-
nized crime.11 Ther~ is, of'course, some tension between 
these two stated congressional objectives, and the ques-
tion of how Congress struck the balance in any partic-
ular instance· cannot be resolved simply through general 
reference to the statute's expressed concern for the pro-
tection of individual privacy. Rather, the starting 
point, as in all statutory construction, is the precise 
wording chosen by Co:qgress in enacting Title III. 
Section 2518 (1) of Title 18, United States Code, 
sets out in detail the requirements for the inform{l,tion 
to be included in an application for an order authorizing 
the interception of wire communications. The sole 
10 See Ommbus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. 90-351, Tit. III, § 801 (b) and (d) , 82 Stat . 211-212 ; S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66. 
11 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. 90-351 , Tit . III , § 801 (c), 82 Stat. 211; S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th 
Cong., 2d Srss., 66-76. 
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prov1s10n pertammg to the identification of persons 
whose communications are to be intercepted is contained 
in § 2518 (l)(b)(iv), which requires that the applica-
tion state "the identity of the person, if known, com-
m{ttin~ the offense and whose communications are to 
be intercepted." (Emphasis supplied.) This statutory, 
language would plainly seem to require the naming of 
a specific person in the wiretap application only when 
law enforcement officials believe that such an individual 
is actually committing one of the offenses specified in 
18 U. S. C. § 2516. Since it is undisputed here that 
Minnie Kahn was not known to the Government to be 
@ngaging in gambling activities at the time the inter-
ception~ dr"der was sougfit, the failure to include her 
name in the application would thus seem to comport 
with the literal language of § 2518 (1) (b)(v). 
Moreover, there is no reason to conclude that the 
omission of Minnie Kahn 's name from the actual wire-
tap order was in conflict with any of the provisions of 
Title III. Section 2518 ( 4) ( a) requires that the order 
specify "the identity of the person, if known, whose 
communications are to be intercepted." Since the judge 
who prepares the order can only be expected to learn 
of the target individual's identity through reference to 
the original application, it can hardly be inferred that 
· this statutory language imposes any broader requirement 
than the identification provisions of § 2518 (l)(b)(iv). 
In effect, the Court of Appeals read these provisio:qs 
of § 2518 as if they required that the application and 
order identify "all persons, known or discoverable, who 
are committing the offense and whose communicti,tions 
are to be intercepted." But that is simply not what 
the statute says: identification is required only of those 
"known" to be "committing the offense.'' Had Congress 
wished to engraft a separate requirement of "discover-
·ability" onto 'the provisions of Title III, it surely would 
10 
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have done so in language plainer than that now em-
bodied in § 2518. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of 
§ 2518 would have a broad impact. A requirement that 
the Government fully investigate the possibility that 
any likely user of a telephone was engaging in criminal 
activities before applying for an interception order would 
greatly subvert the effectiveness of the law enforcement 
mechanism that Congress constructed. In the case at 
hand, the Court of Appeals' holding would require 
the complete investigation not only of Minnie Kahn, 
but also of the two teenaged Kahn children and other 
frequenters of the Kahn residence before a wiretap 
order could be applied for. If the telephone were in 
a store or an office, the Government might well be 
required to investigate every one who had access to 
it-in some cases, literally hundreds of people-even 
though there was no reason to suspect that any of 
them were violating any criminal law. It is thus open 
to considerable doubt that such a requirement would 
'ultimately serve the interests of individual privacy. In 
any event, the statute as actually drafted contains no 
intimation of such total investigative demands.12 
In arriving at its reading of § 2518, the Court of 
Appeals seemed to believe that taking the statute at 
12 lt 1,; true, as the Court of Appeals noted, that 18 U. S. C. 
§§2518 (l)(c) and 2518 (3)(c) require the application to demon-· 
stra te, and the judge authorizing any wire interception to find, tha:t 
"normal investigative procedures" have either failed or appear 
unlikely to succeed. This language, however, is simply designed ~o 
assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situa tions where tradi-
tional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime. 
See generally S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong. , 2d Sess. , 101. Once the 
necessity for the interception has been shown, §§ 2518 (1) (c) and 
2518 (3) (c) do not impose an addi tjonal requirement that the Gov-
ernment investigate all persons who may be using the ::,ubject tele-
phone in order to determine their possible complicity. 
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face value would result in a wiretap order amounting 
to a "virtual general warrant," since the law enforcement 
authorities would be authorized to intercept communi-
catlons of anyone who talked on the named telephone 
line. 471 F. 2d, at 197. But neither the statute nor 
the wiretap order in this case would allow the federal 
. agents such total unfettered discretion. By its own 
terms, the wiretap order in this case conferred authority 
to intercept only communications "concerning the above~ 
described [gambling] offenses." 1 0 Moreover, in accord 
with the statute the order required the agents to exe-
cute the warrant in such a manner as to minimize the 
interception of any innocent conversations.14 And the 
order limited the length of any possible interception 
to 15 days, while requiring status reports as to the 
progress of the wiretap to be submitted to the District 
Judge every five days, so that any possible abuses might 
be quickly discovered and halted. Thus, the failure of 
the order to specify that Mrs. Kahn's conversations 
might be the subject of interception hardly left the 
executing agents free to seize at will every communi-
cation that came over the wire-and there is no indi-
cation that such abuses took place in this case.15 
n 18 U.S. C. § 2518 (4) (c) requires t hat an order au thorizing wire 
interceptions contain : 
" (c) a pa rt icular description of the type of communica tion sought 
to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which 
it relates .'' 
See also 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1 ) (b ) (iii) , imposing a similar require.; 
ment as to the applicat ion for a wirf'tap order. 
But cf. 18 U. S. C. §2517 (5) , providing that under certain cir-
cumstances intercepted conversat ions involving crimes other than 
those identified in the order may be used in evidence. 
14 See n. 10, supra. 
1 5 The fallacy in the Court of Appeals' "general warrant" approach 
may be illustrated by examination of an analogous conventional 
search and seizure. Ii a wa rrant had been issued, upon a showing 
12 
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We conclude, therefore, that Title III requires the-
1iaming of a person in the application or interception 
~rder:· onl:57 when the law enforcement authorities have 
prohabl.e cause to believe that that individual is "com-
mitttin$ the offense" for which the wiretap is sought. 
Since it is undisputed that the Government had no, 
reason to suspect Minnie Kahn of complicity in the 
gambling business before the wire interceptions here· 
began, it follows that under the statute she was among· 
the' class of persons "as yet unknown" covered by Judge 
Campbell's order. 
The remaining question is whether, under the actual 
~ . 
language of Judge Campell's order, only those mter-
cepted conversations to which Irving Kahn himself was 
a party are admissible in evidence at the Kahn's trial, 
as the Court of Appeals concluded. The effect of such 
arr in11Brpretation of the wiretap order in this case would 
be to exclude from evidence the intercepted conversa• 
tions between Minnie Kahn and the "known gambling 
of probable cause, to sea rch the Kahn residence for physical records 
of gambling operations, there could be no quest ion that a subsequent 
seizure of such records bearing Minnie Kahn's handwriting would be 
fully lawful, despite the fact that she had not been identified in the 
warrant nor independently investigated. In fact, as long as the 
property to be seized is described with sufficient specificity , even a 
warrant failing to name the owner of the premises at which a search 
is directed, while not the best practice, has been held to pass muster 
under the Fourth Amendment. See Hanger v. United States, 398 F . 
2d 91, 99 (CA8); Miller v. Sigler, 353 F . 2d 424, 428 (CA8) (dictum); 
Dixon v. United States, 211 F. 2d 547,549 (CA5); Camey v. United 
States, 79 F. 2d 821, 822 (CA6); United States v. Fitzm®rice, 45 F .. 
2d 133, 135 (CAZ) (L. Hand, J.) ; Mascolo, Specificity Requirements 
for Warrants Under the Fourth Amendment : Defining the Zone of 
Privacy, 73 Dickinson L. Rev. 1, 21. See also United State8 v. 
Fiorella, 468 F . 2d 688, 691 (CAZ) ("The Fourth Amendment 
requires a warrant to describe only 'the place to be searched , and the 
persons or things to be seiaed: f\Ot the persons from whom thin~ 
will be seized.") 
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figure" concerning betting information. Again, we are 
unable to read either the District Court order or the 
underlying provisions of Title III as requiring such a 
result. 
The ctrder signed by Judge Campbell in this case 
authorized the Government to "intercept wire com~ 
munications of Irving Kahn and others as yet unknown 
to and from two telephones, subscribed to by Irving 
Kahn." The order does not refer to conversations be':' 
tween Irving Kahn and others; rather, it describes 
"communications of Irving Kahn and others as yet un~ 
known!/ to and from the target telephones. To read 
this la.nguage as requiring that Irving Kahn be a party 
to every intercepted conversation would not only in-
volve a substantial feat of verbal gymnastics, but would 
also render the phrase "and others as yet unknown': 
quite redundant, since Kahn perforce could not com-
municate except with others. 
More6ver, the interpretation of the wiretap authoriza-
tion adopted by the Court of Appeals is at odds with 
one of the stated purposes of Judge Campbell's order. 
The District Judge specifically found that the wiretap I 
was needed to "reveal the identities of [Irving Kahn's] 
confederates. their places of operation, and the nature 
of the conspiracy involved." It is evident that such 
information might be revealed in conversations to whic4 
Irving Kahn was not a party. For example, a con-
federate might call in Kahn's absence, and leave eithei-: 
a name, a return telephone number, or an incriminating 
message. Or, one of Kahn's associates might himself 
come to the family home and employ the target tele-
phones to conduct the gambling business.16 It would 
1
" By referring to the conversations of Kahn and others "to and 
from" the two telephones, the order clearly envisioned that the 
:'others" might qe either receiving or transmitting gambling informa-
tion from the two Kahn telPphones . Yet it could hardly be expected 
i4 
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be difficult under any circumstances to believe that g, 
District Judge meant such intercepted conversations to 
be inadmissible at any future trial; given the specific 
ianguage employed by Judge Campbell in the wiretap 
order' today before us, such a conclusion is simply 
-Untenable. 
Nothing in Title III requires that, despite the order1s 
language, it must be read to exclude Minnie Kahn's 
communications. As already noted , 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
( l )( b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a) require identification of the 
person committing the offense only "if known." The 
clear implication of this language is that when there 
is probable cause to believe that a particular telephone 
is being used to commit an offense but no particular 
person is identifiable, a wire interception order may, 
nevertheless, properly issue under the statute.11 It nec-
essarily follows that Congress could not have intended 
that the authority to intercept must be limited to those 
conversations between a party named in the order and 
others, since at least in some cases, the order might not 
name any specific party at all .18 
For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
was in error when it interpreted the phrase "others as 
yet unknown" so as to exclude conversations involving 
in these insta nces that Irving Kahn would always be t he person .-on 
the other end of the line. especially since either bettors or Kahn's 
confederates m the gambling business might often have occasion 
to dial the tPlephone numbers in issue. 
1 7 Such a situation might obta in if a bettor revealed to law 
enforcement authorities that he had repeatedly called a certain tele-
phone number in order to place wagers, but had never been told the 
name of the person at the other end of the line. 
1 8 ln fact, t he Senate rejected an amendment to Title III that would 
have provided that only the conversations of those specifically named 
in the wiretap order could be admitted into evidence. 114 Cong. 
Rec. 14718 (1968); (Amendment 735) , 
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Minnie Kahn from the purview of the wiretap order. 
We further hold that neither the language of Judge 
Campbell's order nor that of Title III requires the sup-
pression of legally intercepted conversations to which 
Irving Kahn was not himself a party. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is reversed , and the case is remanded to that court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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